year was not "more haughty than was necessary." On the contrary, the Great King was not offended by it and three years later was even willing to come to the aid of the Athenians. Their refusal of his offer in 341/40 was, however, regarded as insulting by the Great King and was probably responsible for his harsh rejection, in a letter described by Aeschines (3. 238) as "insolent and barbarous," of later Athenian pleas for assistance. We can also see that the reply delivered to the Persian embassy of 344/43 should not be interpreted as an endorsement of Philip's plans for uniting all the Greeks in a crusade against Persia. There is much to be learned from the fragments of earlier authors preserved by Didymus in his commentary on Demosthenes—provided, of course, that we do not allow his misuse of them to lead us astray.[27]

EDWARD M. HARRIS
Brooklyn College and the Graduate Center, The City University of New York

27. I would like to thank the journal's referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. Gratitude is also due to the Editor for his constructive criticisms, which have greatly improved this article.

THE PERSIAN FLEET IN 334

To modern historians one of the curiosities of Alexander's conquest of the Persian Empire is the failure of the superior Persian fleet even to attempt to prevent his passage to Asia. Ulrich Wilcken remarks: "it was lucky for him . . . that the Persians had not thought of preventing his crossing with their vastly superior fleet." J. R. Hamilton expresses "surprise" at the lack of interference by the Persians. According to A. R. Burn, P. A. Brunt, and A. B. Bosworth the fleet simply did not arrive in time; Bosworth states that because of the Persians' Egyptian campaign of 336 the fleet was unavailable until 334. D. W. Engels believes that the fleet timed its arrival in the Aegean to correspond with the harvest; it could not be adequately provisioned before June.[1]

None of these explanations is adequate. It is very unlikely that the Persians would not have thought of using the fleet; nor is it credible that Alexander would have staked his entire expedition on the chance that the Persian fleet would be late. Engels' contention that the fleet could not have been adequately supplied prior to the harvest also fails to convince. The fleet would have been traveling as far as the Hellespont along friendly and often prosperous shores. Cilicia in particular was a grain-exporting region, and the alluvial plains of western Asia were likewise very productive.[2] It is, therefore, likely that large quantities of grain would have been available along the route. Moreover, the

1. Wilcken, *Alexander the Great,* trans. G. C. Richards (New York, 1967), p. 83; Hamilton, *Alexander the Great* (Pittsburgh, 1979), p. 53; Burn, *Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic World* (New York, 1962), p. 70; Brunt, *Arrian: "Anabasis Alexandri,"* vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), pp. lxiv–lxv, 453; Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's "History of Alexander,"* vol. 1 (Oxford, 1980), p. 137; Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978), p. 33.

2. See E. C. Semple, *The Geography of the Mediterranean Region: Its Relation to Ancient History* (New York, 1971), pp. 344, 346.

fleet would have been accompanied by transport vessels that could supply the armada's needs along those stretches of the coast where grain was scarce. During the abortive invasion of Egypt in 373, the Persian fleet included a large number of transports carrying food and other supplies (Diod. 15. 41. 3). In 415 the Athenians sailed to Sicily with thirty grainships, since they were traveling through territories where they might not be welcome (Thuc. 6. 22. 1).

Carriers with a capacity of 100 to 150 tons were in common use, and ships capable of transporting 350 to 500 tons were "by no means rare."[3] Consequently, in light of Engels' estimate that the 400-ship Persian war fleet consumed 120 tons of grain a day,[4] and assuming the unlikely possibility that no grain would be available en route, we can calculate that on a forty-day voyage from Phoenicia to the Hellespont the expedition would require the support of only around fifty cargo ships capable of carrying 100 tons each.[5]

Bosworth's argument that the fleet was not freed from its involvement in the Egyptian campaign until 334 is possible, given our dearth of information on this expedition, but very unlikely. Egypt was invaded late in 336, and by January or February 335 the Nile defenses had been broken.[6] The fleet probably would have been needed only for the penetration of the Delta (cf. Diod. 15. 43. 4). Chababash, the native ruler, did not have the resources that Nectanebo II possessed in 343, when Persia last invaded Egypt. Chababash's rule and this episode of Egyptian independence lasted only a few years, whereas the previous episode had lasted more than sixty.[7] Moreover, the punishment meted out to Egypt in 343 was severe; her cities were destroyed and her temples looted.[8] It is unlikely that Egypt could have recovered sufficiently in so short a time as to offer Persia much of a challenge. Certainly the Egyptian campaign of 336 and 335 succeeded, except for mopping-up operations, before the Nile flooding commenced in June 335. In the past a campaign that failed to penetrate the Nile defenses before the flood had to be abandoned (Diod. 15. 43. 4).[9] There is no evidence that the Egyptians had a fleet or that they deflected the initial invasion; the Persian fleet should therefore have been freed from Egyptian service in plenty of time to intercept Alexander at the Hellespont in the spring of 334. Indeed, Diodorus (17. 7. 2) implies that by the summer of 335 the fleet was no longer needed for the Egyptian campaign. The fleet was not, however, available in time to aid the Persian campaign in 335 against Alexander's advance force.[10]

3. L. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (Princeton, 1971), p. 172.

4. *Alexander,* p. 32.

5. This calculation is based on the following assumptions: (1) the fleet would begin its voyage from Phoenicia; (2) grain would come either from Egypt or from the Hauran (cf. Semple, *Geography,* pp. 345–46); (3) the fleet would be under sail for most of the voyage (this would certainly be the case given the presence of transports; see Casson, *Ships,* pp. 292–93); (4) the fleet would sail only twelve hours a day, the maximum for a trireme (see A. W. Gomme, "A Forgotten Factor in Greek Naval Strategy," *JHS* 53 [1933]: 193); (5) the fleet would average 2 knots (a fleet with favorable winds averaged 2–3 knots, with unfavorable winds, 1–1½; see Casson, *Ships,* p. 296).

6. See F. K. Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jahrhundert vor der Zeitwende* (Berlin, 1953), pp. 187–88; A. T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago, 1948), pp. 492–93.

7. See Olmstead, *History,* p. 373.

8. Ibid., p. 440.

9. Cf. ibid., p. 438.

10. See N. G. L. Hammond, *Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman* (Park Ridge, N.J., 1980), p. 66.

In 336 Philip had sent Parmenio and Attalus with a force of ten thousand men to "liberate" the Greek cities of Asia (Diod. 16. 91. 2, Polyaenus *Strat.* 5. 44. 4). The campaign initially was a great success, securing for the Macedonians a strip of territory from Cyzicus to Ephesus. In 335 Memnon, the Rhodian mercenary commander (Diod. 17. 18. 2), with five thousand mercenaries launched a counterattack that recaptured Ephesus (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 17. 10–11, Polyaenus *Strat.* 5. 44. 4–5), Magnesia on the Sipylus (Polyaenus *Strat.* 5. 44. 4), and (perhaps) Lampsacus,[11] but failed to capture Cyzicus (Diod. 17. 7. 8, Polyaenus *Strat.* 5. 44. 5). This campaign would have been aided substantially if the fleet had been available, but the evidence indicates that it was not (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 1. 17. 10–11, Polyaenus *Strat.* 5. 44. 4–5).

The Persians surely knew that Alexander was coming. They were in general very well informed on Macedonian operations (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 10. 1, Plut. *Dem.* 23. 3, Just. *Epit.* 11. 4. 9–12). Soon after his father's death Alexander had convened the Greeks and secured their endorsement of the Persian expedition and his leadership (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 1. 1–2, Diod. 17. 4. 9, Just. *Epit.* 11. 2. 5). After the reduction of Thebes Alexander had returned to Macedonia to plan the spring offensive into Asia (Diod. 17. 16. 1, Arr. *Anab.* 1. 11. 1). Though unconcerned at the time of Alexander's accession, Darius soon took Alexander and the threat of an invasion very seriously (Diod. 17. 7. 1–2). As noted above, Memnon in 335 was operating in the Hellespont with five thousand mercenaries, and the Persian fleet was being made ready for action (Diod. 17. 7. 2, Polyaenus *Strat.* 5. 44. 4). There could have been no surprise when Alexander landed in Asia in May.[12] Indeed, the only real evidence for surprise is Diodorus' comment (17. 18. 2) that "the Persian satraps and generals had not acted in time to prevent the crossing of the Macedonians." None of our other sources implies that the Persian commanders planned to block Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont. Without the fleet such an operation would not have had much chance of success. On the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont there were many landing sites that the fleet could reach more easily than an infantry force that had to change its position. Though the cavalry could more easily follow the fleet's movements, without infantry the horsemen could not hope to block Alexander's landing. Consequently, it is likely that Diodorus' source, or Diodorus himself, has injected this remark. All the evidence suggests that after Memnon's failure to drive Alexander's advance force from the Hellespont there was no further attempt to block his crossing (Diod. 17. 7, Polyaenus *Strat.* 5. 44. 4).

The question still remains, why did the Persian fleet not attempt to prevent Alexander's passage to Asia? Though a blockade in the modern sense was not possible, a fleet could certainly hinder a crossing. Sulla was prevented from pursuing Archelaus to Chalcis because Mithridates controlled the sea and, therefore, the Euripus Channel (App. *Mith.* 45; cf. 50; Paus. 9. 7. 4). Even

11. See E. Badian, "Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia," in *Ancient Society and Institutions,* ed. E. Badian (Oxford, 1966), pp. 40–41 (on Ephesus), 63 n. 20 (on Magnesia); Bosworth, *Historical Commentary,* 1:107–8 (on Lampsacus).

12. Alexander set out for the Hellespont probably in March (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 1. 11. 3) and crossed to Asia in May (cf. Engels, *Alexander,* pp. 27–29). The battle on the Granicus occurred in May or June of 334 (Plut. *Alex.* 16. 2).

though Caesar was able to cross the Adriatic in 48 despite Pompey's naval superiority, he did so secretively, in the dead of winter, and succeeded in bringing over to Greece only two-thirds of his forces ([Caes.] *BCiv.* 3. 6). Early in the spring Antony, taking advantage of the wind conditions and using sailing ships, succeeded in eluding the Pompeian fleet and joined Caesar (ibid. 26). Though successful, Antony's ships were saved in part because of the fortuitous appearance of a storm that prevented the enemy fleet from intercepting them (ibid.).

The Persians possessed the superior fleet, but they lacked the element essential for even an attempt to block Alexander's crossing: a friendly shore. Consider again the case of Pompey, whose superior fleet failed to prevent Antony's crossing in part because of its inability to find a suitable anchorage on or near the Italian shore. Though Libo, the Pompeian commander, did occupy an island dominating the entrance to Brundisium, the island lacked water ([Caes.] *BCiv.* 3. 23–24). By carefully patrolling the Italian coast, Antony was able to prevent the Pompeians from taking on water and, in consequence, forced them to abandon the island and retreat to the Greek coast (ibid. 24). From there the Pompeian fleet was unable to prevent Antony's eventual crossing (ibid. 26).

Though it had to abandon the island in the harbor of Brundisium, the Pompeian fleet still controlled much of the Greek coast. Yet the Persians, in contrast, did not command even their own side of the Hellespont. Despite Memnon's successes in the campaign of 335, the Macedonian advance party at the time of Alexander's invasion controlled not only the European side of the strait[13] but much of the Hellespontine coast in Asia. Under pressure from the Persian counterattack of 335 the Macedonians had withdrawn from Ionia and Aeolis north to Rhoetium (Diod. 17. 7. 10).[14] Further north, Abydos, Arisbe, and Percote remained loyal to Macedonia. Mytilene too was probably within the Macedonian sphere: she resisted vigorously the Persian counteroffensive in 334 and 333 (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 1. 1–5), and all of Lesbos appears to have been part of the League of Corinth ([Dem.] 17. 7; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 2. 1. 4). In the absence of any evidence that Memnon had a fleet at his disposal in 335, we must suppose that the islands would have remained either pro-Macedonian or neutral.[15] Lemnos, Imbros, and Samos were still Athenian possessions occupied by Athenian cleruchs[16] and were, therefore, nominally Macedonian allies. Tenedos was probably still independent.[17]

13. See K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*[2], vol. 3 (Berlin, 1923), p. 572, n. 3; A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *Demosthenes and the Last Days of Greek Freedom, 384–322 B.C.* (London, 1914), pp. 396–97.

14. A. J. Heisserer (*Alexander the Great and the Greeks: The Epigraphic Evidence* [Norman, Okla., 1980], pp. 58, 132; cf. Badian, "Alexander," p. 43) assumes that Memnon's offensive swept away all of Parmenio's conquests on the Asiatic coast except Abydos (see Arr. *Anab.* 1. 11. 6), but the evidence suggests otherwise: Cyzicus remained an ally (Diod. 17. 7. 8, Polyaenus *Strat.* 5. 44. 5); and after crossing to Asia the Macedonians encamped at Arisbe and Percote (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 12. 6). They bypassed Lampsacus, which was either under Persian control or allied to Persia (ibid.; cf. Bosworth, *Historical Commentary,* 1:107–8).

15. Cf. Heisserer, *Alexander,* pp. 133–34.

16. See C. Roebuck, "The Settlements of Philip II in 338 B.C.," *CP* 43 (1948): 81.

17. Cf. F. H. Marshall, *The Second Athenian Confederacy* (Cambridge, 1905), p. 120.

The chief Hellespontine harbors in Asia were Cyzicus, Lampsacus, and Abydos. Of these only Lampsacus was friendly to the Persians (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 1. 12. 6, Paus. 6. 18. 2–4).[18] The Persian fleet, therefore, though without peer on the sea, would have faced difficulties finding a safe anchorage in the Hellespont. More important, with Sestos and Abydos under Alexander's control, the Macedonian fleet had to cross only about fourteen hundred yards of open sea. Without the control of the Hellespontine coast the Persians had no nearby base of operations and, consequently, no hope of success in resisting Alexander's crossing—especially since the crossing probably could have been carried out in a day.[19] If the Persians beached anywhere within the area of Macedonian occupation, they risked attack, and if they beached in more hospitable territory, the Macedonians would be free to ferry troops across the strait. Moreover, the European coast is sheltered from the winds and the current, whereas the Asiatic coast is exposed to both;[20] under these circumstances the Persians would have needed a harbor for any protracted stay.

Nor could the Persian fleet have operated for long periods far from shore. Warships, with their large crews and cramped quarters, could carry food and water only for one or, at most, two days; triremes would need to be beached every twenty-four hours for the preparation of meals.[21] Furthermore, there was no room for sleeping comfortably on board.[22]

For a Persian naval expedition to succeed in blocking Alexander's advance into Asia, the Asiatic coast had to be under Persian control. But Memnon in 335 had been unable to dislodge the Macedonians completely. In view of this undertaking's importance—at least as it appears in retrospect—it is surprising that Memnon had only five thousand troops and no war-fleet. The most likely explanation for the diminutive size of his forces is the Persian commitment to Egypt. This commitment would have been large both because of the new Persian ruler's desire to crush the revolt of Chababash quickly and thoroughly, to forestall other uprisings, and because in 336, after Philip's recent death and the accession of his young son, the Persians thought themselves free of the threat from the west.[23] Once it became clear that the threat was still present, the invasion of Egypt was already under way. Not only was the fleet made unavailable for action in the Hellespont before the summer of 335, but the Persian infantry and most of the Greek mercenaries in the Persians' employ would probably have been unavailable until late in 335, when they had retaken the Nile valley.[24]

18. See Badian, "Alexander," pp. 43–44.

19. A transport trireme could carry 85 men, a horse transport 30 horses (see Casson, *Ships,* p. 93); Alexander had 160 triremes and a large number of cargo ships (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 11. 6). Diod. 17. 17. 2 mentions but 60 warships, and Just. *Epit.* 11. 6. 2 mentions 182; but for the superiority of Arrian's figures, see Brunt, *Arrian,* 1:453.

20. See M. Cary, *The Geographic Background of Greek and Roman History* (Oxford, 1949), p. 300.

21. See Gomme, "Forgotten Factor," p. 193.

22. Ibid.; see also Casson, *Ships,* p. 44.

23. See Kienitz, *Politische Geschichte,* p. 188; Olmstead, *History,* p. 493. Shortly after Philip's death, in response to an Athenian appeal for funds (Aeschin. 3. 238–39), the king replied: "I shall give you no money. Do not ask for it, as you will not get it."

24. On Persian operations in Egypt, see above at nn. 9 and 10. We can only guess why the twenty thousand mercenaries present at the Granicus (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 14. 4) were not available to Memnon in

Given the inability of Memnon's offensive to dislodge the Macedonians from their control of the Hellespont in 335, the Persians clearly could not hope to prevent Alexander's crossing in the spring of 334. When Parmenio and, subsequently, Calas succeeded in maintaining this control, Alexander was able to leave Macedonia for Asia with the knowledge that his crossing would be unopposed.[25] The Persian fleet, then, was not surprisingly absent from the Hellespont in 334; it was, with good reason, never meant to be there.

EDWARD M. ANSON
University of Arkansas, Little Rock

335. Perhaps satrapal politics was involved (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 1. 12. 9–10), or perhaps these troops were scattered about Asia Minor and could be assembled only after some delay. It is also possible that many of these mercenaries had been dispatched to Asia Minor from Darius' army after the victory in Egypt: this would explain why they were commanded not by Memnon, or by any of the satraps, but by the Persian Omares (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 16. 3). In the successful invasion of Egypt in 343 Greek mercenaries had played a prominent role; see H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus* (Oxford, 1933), pp. 166–69.

25. Parmenio had been one of the leaders of the advance party, but he was recalled to Macedonia before Alexander's crossing (Diod. 17. 16. 2), and Calas was left in charge (cf. Diod. 17. 7. 10).

BRUNO SNELL AND FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE ON THE SPEECH OF ASSES

In 1935 Bruno Snell published a short article, entitled "Das I-Ah des goldenen Esels," in which he endeavored to demonstrate, by comparing various passages from the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius and from the Λούκιος ἢ Ὄνος attributed to Lucian, that the braying sound of an ass was represented in Greek by οὐ.[1] He concluded the piece with a sentence that was to become famous in the world of classical scholars: "Es stellt sich also heraus, dass das einzige wirkliche Wort, das ein griechischer Esel sprechen konnte, das Wort für 'nein' war, während kurioserweise die deutschen Esel gerade umgekehrt immer nur 'ja' sagen." When Snell reprinted this article in 1966, he added the following note of explanation: "Um die Situation zu illustrieren, derentwegen ich den letzten Satz (und den ganzen Aufsatz) schrieb, füge ich eine Photographie bei, die ich der Liebenswürdigkeit von Herrn Dr. Werner Jochmann verdanke, dem Leiter der Forschungsstelle für die Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus in Hamburg. Sie gibt ein Plakat wieder, das zur Volksabstimmung am 19. August 1934 aufforderte (man sollte dem Gesetz vom 2. August 1934 zustimmen)."[2] The photograph referred to in this note shows a poster that states in part "Der Führer hat dieses prophetische Wort Bismarcks wahr gemacht. *Ihm gilt unsere Treue und unsere Gefolgschaft. Ein ganzes Volk sagt am 19. August:* JA."

In *Also Sprach Zarathustra,* Friedrich Nietzsche represents Zarathustra as encountering a number of "higher men" (*höhere Menschen*), including a pope

1. *Hermes* 70 (1935): 355–56.
2. *Gesammelte Schriften* (Göttingen, 1966), pp. 200–201.